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11 Introduction and motivation
Economies such as the US and the UK have seen large and unprecedented increases in wage in-
equality amongst workers over the last 30 to 40 years. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where we
show the way that the interquartile ranges of male and female log hourly wages have evolved for
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Figure 1: Interquartile range of log wages
These increases in inequality have been associated with increased returns to education, cohort
eﬀects and increases in the returns to unobserved skill.1 A variety of interpretations have been
given as to why these events have occurred; these include skill biased technical change, globaliza-
tion induced increased in competition for low skill workers and changes in the supply of graduates.
Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000) show that the increases in the UK can be attributed to per-
1See Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) for the US and Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000) for the UK.
2manent diﬀerences across cohorts and in changes in the returns to education. At the same time
the gap between the wages of working men and working women have fallen.2
In parallel with these momentous changes in the distribution of observed wages, employment
rates for males and females and the composition of the workforce have changed. Employment for
men aged 22 to 59 has decreased from 93% in 1978 to 83% in 2000. This decline is not conﬁned
to older men and reﬂects more than the increase in early retirement. Women on the other hand,
especially those below 30, saw an increase in their employment. In Figure 2 we show the age
proﬁle for employment for 1978 and for 2000 by gender.
T h ed e c l i n ei ne m p l o y m e n ts i n c et h el a t e1 9 7 0 sh a si t ss o u r c e si nan u m b e ro fp o s s i b l ec a u s e s
that interact with each other. The large demand shock of the early 1980s combined with the
welfare system and the wage setting institutions at the time to cause persistent unemployment.3 A
mechanism propagating such persistence and relating to older individuals was the steady increase
of those receiving sickness and disability beneﬁts during the 1980s, from which there is little
incentive to drop out and return to work.4 Blundell, Reed and Stoker (2003) also emphasize the
role of the reforms to the housing market and in particular the change since 1983 in rent setting for
the public sector, leading to a large and steady increase in rents over the 1980s and 1990s. Rents
for those on low income are subsidized through housing beneﬁt, which carries an implicit tax rate
on earnings of 95% when combined with other welfare programmes.5 The reform inadvertently
led to a steady increase over time in the range of earnings over which some groups of people
faced high marginal tax rates. This would have aﬀected both the level and the composition of
participants.6 These institutional changes aﬀected older cohorts disproportionately because they
were over-represented in the public sector housing, partly explaining the more rapid decline in
2See Harkness (1996) for the UK and Blau (1998) and Blau and Kahn (1997) for the US.
3see Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991).
4see Disney and Webb (1991)
5Housing beneﬁt on its own has a marginal withdrawal rate of 65%.
6Those with children and those in high rent areas have experienced large relative increases in out of work beneﬁt
income.
3employment for older people. The above factors, will have aﬀected older and unskilled individuals
more than the rest, although not exclusively, because out of work beneﬁt income increased for all.
Figure 3 illustrates that the change in employment has been heavily skill biased. In this
paper we deﬁne skill by three education groups: those leaving full time education at or before 16
(statutory schooling), those who completed education sometime between 17 and 18 (high school
graduates) and those who completed full time education after 18 (some college). For women most
of the increase in employment can be accounted for by the increase in employment of women
with more than the minimal level of education. The employment rate of the statutory schooling
group has shown a slight decline over the entire time period. Blundell, Duncan and Meghir
(1998) document changes in the incentive structure. Moreover, it is possible that the gradual
implementation and enforcement of anti-discrimination practices, formally introduced in the 1970s
may have made career progression for skilled women more of a reality over this time period (see
Stewart and Greenhalgh, 1984) .
As the composition of the workforce changes so will in general the observed distribution of
wages for workers, whether the aggregate participation rate changes or not. This obscures the
changes in the actual/uncensored distribution of wages, preventing us from understanding the
nature of the change in inequality and the associated changes in educational, age and gender wage
diﬀerentials. A recent example which shows how important such selection issues can be for wages
is the paper by Blundell, Reed and Stoker (2003).
Selection eﬀects have been central to labour economics ever since the pioneering work of
Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974, 1979). Approaches are either parametric7 or semi/non-
parametric.8 Unfortunately, structural economic models fall short of delivering the assumptions
required for identiﬁcation. Taking a stand on the labour market paradigm is generally not suﬃcient
7See Heckman (1979) or Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
8See for example, Powell (1987), Newey (1988), Das, Newey and Powell (2003), Heckman (1990), Choi (1990),
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Figure 3: Employment by education level for men and women over time
5to point-identify the underlying distribution of wages without further stronger assumptions.9 The
theoretical restrictions, can however deliver informative bounds to the distribution of wages. Thus
our approach is to exploit restrictions that can be justiﬁed from an economic perspective to bound
changes in within and between-group inequality, including changes in educational and gender wage
diﬀerentials.
This paper has two objectives. The ﬁrst is methodological: to develop bounds for the distribu-
tion of wages, which is censored by non-participation, using restrictions motivated by theory and
building on the existing literature on bounds and in particular on the papers by Manski (1994)
and Manski and Pepper (2000). We introduce a restrictions imposing positive selection into work;
this is expressed as ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance of the distribution of wages of non-workers by
that of workers or as a weaker version, which imposes that the median wage of workers is higher
than the median wage of non-workers. We also derive sharp bounds for the interquartile range,
which is our measure of inequality. Further, along the lines of using additional information, we also
e x p l o r et h eu s eo fe x c l u s i o nr e s t r i c t i o n sw h e r es o m ev a r i a b l e sa r ea s s u m e dt oa ﬀect labour force
participation but not the distribution of wages as well as a much weaker version, the monotonicity
restriction. In this case we allow for the instrument to aﬀect wages as well as participation, with
the restriction that its impact on the distribution of wages is monotonic and we show how this
restriction can be used to tighten the bounds to the distribution.
Some of the restrictions we impose have testable implications because when they fail they can
lead to the bounds crossing. We develop tests for the null hypothesis that the bounds do not
cross. We use a combination of the parametric and non-parametric bootstrap to derive critical
values for our tests, as well as for estimating conﬁdence intervals for parameters of interest. We
present Monte Carlo evidence indicating that our tests are powerful for reasonable sample sizes.
Our work is related to the now growing literature on inference for partially identiﬁed models.10
The second objective of the paper is a substantive empirical analysis of the changes in the
9See Heckman and Honoré (1990).
10See Imbens and Manski (2004), Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2004) for example.
6wage distribution. To characterize the changes we provide bounds to changes in overall inequality
and in within group inequality as measured by the interquartile range of log real wages. We then
provide bounds on how educational, age and gender wage diﬀerentials have changed. The key
distinctive characteristic of these results is that we allow for the eﬀects of selection and we provide
alternative bounds with weaker or stronger restrictions. Our main data source is the UK Family
Expenditure Survey from 1978 to 2000. We also use British Household Panel Survey to provide
circumstantial evidence on positive selection into the labour market.
Wages is not the only area where bounds and restricted bounds ﬁnd applicability. There has
been a growth in the use of bounds in industrial organization such as in the work of Berry and
Tamer (2005) and Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006) who also develop results on inference in
set identiﬁed models. Honoré and Lleras-Muney (2005) use restrictions on bounds to identify a
competing risks model in the context of cancer research, Heckman and Vytlacil (2004) as well
as Vytlacil (2005) uses restrictions on bounds to identify treatment eﬀects. Honoré and Tamer
(2004) examine the identiﬁability of dynamic discrete choice models and show how parameters
that may not be point identiﬁed can be bounded tightly. Finally, Angrist, Bettinger and Kremer
(2004) use bounds to identify the eﬀect of school vouchers on test scores, where the selection
problem arises because not all treated pupils opt to take the test, while Lee (2004) employs the
Imbens and Angrist (1994) monotonicity restriction to provide bounds on treatment eﬀects in the
absence of exclusion restrictions.
Our work also relates to a number of other papers including Koenker and Bassett (1978) who
developed the use of quantiles; Buchinsky (1994, 1998) and Gosling, Machin and Meghir (2000)
who use quantiles for analyzing the distribution of wages. Heckman Smith and Clements (1997)
and Heckman LaLonde and Smith (1998) who investigate bounds for the joint distribution when
only the marginals are identiﬁed, and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2004) who consider the use
of instruments combined with index restrictions. Our approach allows us to obtain very tight
bounds on parameters of interest and in some cases close to point estimates, while preserving
7the robustness of a non-parametric approach and imposing only relatively weak and transparent
restrictions.
In the next section we show how we derive bounds for the censored wage distribution when
restrictions are available. We complete the discussion on bounds by discussing a wage determi-
nation model that could be used to interpret our results and we explain the identiﬁcation issue
that led us to use bounds rather than attempt to point estimate the wage distribution. We then
discuss estimation of these bounds, as well as relevant speciﬁcation tests. Finally, we discuss the
data and our empirical results.
2 Worst case bounds and bounds with restrictions
Let W and X denote the random variable and the conditioning vector respectively. In our case the
dependent variable W should be taken to be the log wage and X should be understood to include
gender, age, education and year. When W is observed, the indicator variable E equals 1 and when
W is not observed, E equals 0.I no u rc a s eE indicates whether the person is employed or not.
The probability of E =1given X = x is written as P (x). In our analysis this is the employment
probability for individuals with characteristics x. We write the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of W given X = x by F (w|x),t h a tg i v e nX = x and E =1by F (w|x,E =1 ) ,a n dt h a t
given X = x and E =0by F (w|x,E =0 ) .W h i l eF (w|x),t h eo b j e c to fi n t e r e s t ,i sn o ti d e n t i ﬁed
(because of non-random sample selection), we can write
F (w|x)=F (w|x,E =1 )P (x)+F (w|x,E =0 )[ 1− P (x)]. (1)
Given that the data identify both F (w|x,E =1 )and P (x) the problem can be respeciﬁed as one
in which only F (w|x,E =0 )is unknown. In our application this should be understood as the
distribution of wages rejected by those not taking up employment and F(w|x) is an equilibrium
distribution at a point in time which is not invariant to changes in P(x).
Our starting point for the analysis is the work by Manski (1994) who notes that once the
8inequality:
0 ≤ F (w|x,E =0 )≤ 1
is substituted into equation (1), the bounds to the cumulative distribution function become:
F (w|x,E =1 )P (x) ≤ F(w|x) ≤ F (w|x,E =1 )P(x)+[ 1− P (x)]. (2)
The bounds can then be translated to give the worst case bounds on the conditional quantiles.11
Denoting by wq (x) the qth quantile of F(w|x),w eh a v e
wq(l) (x) ≤ wq (x) ≤ wq(u) (x)
where wq(l) (x) is the lower bound and wq(u) (x) is the upper bound which solve the equations
q = F (w|x,E =1 )P(x)+[ 1− P (x)] and q = F (w|x,E =1 )P (x), (3)
with respect to w, respectively.12 Unless there are restrictions on the support of W, we can only
identify the lower bound to quantiles q ≥ 1 − P(x) and upper bounds for quantiles q ≤ P(x).
In general we can not identify bounds to means and variances or higher order moments unless
we impose further restrictions. We thus focus on quantiles to characterize the bounds to the
distribution.
2.1 Imposing restrictions to tighten the bounds
Ah i g h e rP (x) implies tighter bounds on quantiles. With the employment rates observed in our
data, the worst case bounds can be informative about certain aspects of wages, such as life-cycle
wage growth for men. However, in many cases they are uninformative. We seek to tighten the
bounds on quantiles by imposing restrictions motivated by theoretical considerations about the
employment process.
11Proposition 3, p.152.
12The approach of Brown (1984) is quite similar to this but it is less general. Essentially Brown compares the
evolution of the observed median with the worst case lower bound.
92.1.1 Stochastic Dominance and the median restriction
In the standard labour supply model individuals with higher wages will be more likely to work
unless the diﬀerence between wages and reservation wages is negatively associated with wages.13
We express such positive selection into the labour market by assuming that the wages of those
observed working will ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate those of the non-workers. More formally,
when 0 <P(x) < 1 we assume that
F(w|x,E =1 )≤ F(w|x,E =0 ) ∀w,x (4)
for each w with 0 <F(w|x) < 1 or equivalently
Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x) ≤ Pr(E =1 |W>w , x )
for each w.The equivalence follows from the equality
F(w|x,E =1 )− F(w|x,E =0 )
=
F (w|x)(1− F (w|x))(Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x) − Pr(E =1 |W>w , x ))
P (x)(1− P (x))
which is a consequence of the Bayes rule. Under this assumption the bounds to the distribution
of wages become
F (w|x,E =1 )≤ F(w|x) ≤ F (w|x,E =1 )P(x)+[ 1− P (x)]. (5)
For some groups there may be a strong enough positive relationship between wages and reser-
vation wages to undermine the stochastic dominance assumption. This could be induced in part
by the fact that we do not condition on assets in the probability of participation and these are
likely to be positively related to past earnings. As asset income is more likely to be an issue for
those with very high wages, we also consider a weaker restriction, namely that for individuals
with observed characteristic x, the median wage oﬀer for those not working is not higher than the
13We may expect individuals with higher preference for work and low reservation wages to have invested more
in human capital in the past and thus to end up with higher wages.
10median observed wage, w50(E=1) (x). This implies that
0 ≤ F(w|x,E =0 )≤ 1 if w<w 50(E=1) (x)
0.5 ≤ F(w|x,E =0 )≤ 1 if w ≥ w50(E=1) (x)
(6)
This is equivalent to assuming that the probability of observing someone working with a wage
above the median is higher than if their wage is below the median, conditional on x.T h er e s t r i c t i o n
implied by equation (6) which we call the “median restriction” sets the bounds as
F(w|x,E =1 ) P(x)
≤ F(w|x) ≤ if w<w 50(E=1) (x)
F(w|x,E =1 ) P(x)+( 1− P(x))
F(w|x,E =1 ) P(x)+0 .5(1 − P(x))
≤ F(w|x) ≤ if w ≥ w50(E=1) (x)
F(w|x,E =1 ) P(x)+( 1− P(x)).
(7)
As equation (7) shows, this restriction provides tighter bounds to every quantile at the median
and above.
Although weaker than the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance assumption, the median restriction
is not incontrovertible and may fail for some groups and in particular for women and for older
m e n . F i r s t ,i fh i g hw a g ew o m e na r em a t c h e dw i t hh i g hw a g em e n ,t h e no u to fw o r ki n c o m eo f
women could be increasing in their potential earnings and thus associated with higher reservation
wages.14 Second, as more skilled women tend to delay rather than avoid childbirth, those in the
older groups with pre-school children (and hence less likely to work) could be the higher wage
women. Lastly, older people with high enough productivity may have saved suﬃciently to retire
early. If there are enough such individuals above the median in each of these groups they could
lead to violations of the assumption for that group. In the empirical section we use panel data to
examine this assumption. Now we turn to restrictions that do not impose positive selection into
the labour market.
14see Neal (2004)
112.1.2 Using determinants of employment to tighten the bounds
An exclusion restriction Manski (1994) shows that if W is independent of Z conditional on
X i.e.
F(w|x,z)=F(w|x) ∀w,x,z
then the bounds to the conditional distribution of W given X is given by
max
z F(w|x,z,E =1 ) P(x,z) ≤ F(w|x) ≤ min
z F(w|x,z,E =1 ) P(x,z)+1− P(x,z). (8)
This formula can easily be modiﬁed to combine the exclusion restriction with the median restric-
tion, by replacing F(w|x,z,E =1 ) P(x,z) b yt h el o w e rb o u n dg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 7 ) .
In general since F(w|x,z,E =1 )depends on z, ﬁnding the minima and the maxima of P(x,z)
over z will not identify the tightest bounds.
N o t et h a tw ec a nr e w r i t et h el o w e rb o u n dF(w|x,z,E =1 )P r ( x,z) as
F(w|x)Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x,z)
when W and Z are independent given X. This implies that the lower bound is maximized at
z that maximizes Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x,z). Analogously, the upper bound is minimized at z
that maximizes Pr(E =1 |W>w , x , z ). Thus in order for the lower bound to be tightened at
w, Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x,z) needs to vary over z and for the upper bound to be tightened at
w, Pr(E =1 |W>w , x , z ) needs to vary over z. If neither of these conditions are met then
the exclusion restriction does not help in tightening the bounds. When F(w|x,z)=F(w|x) a
suﬃcient condition for the bounds to be tightened is that P(x,z) depends on z.
T h e r ei sn o t h i n gi nt h ed e ﬁnition of the bounds obtained above that forces the minimum of the
upper bounds to lie above the maximum of the lower bounds if the exclusion restriction is false.
Thus in cases where W and Z are not conditionally independent it is possible for the bounds to
cross and the upper bound for some values of Z to lie below the lower bounds. Later we construct
a test of the null hypothesis that the bounds are equal against the alternative that the upper
12bound is lower than the lower bound. If we reject the hypothesis this is evidence against the
exclusion restriction. However it is possible that the restriction is false but that the bounds do
not cross.
Weakening the exclusion restriction: Monotonicity Strong exclusion restrictions of the
type discussed above may not always be credible. Following Manski and Pepper (2000), we might
however, be prepared to assume the direction of the relationship between w and z.T h u sw en o w
derive bounds under the assumption that the distribution of wages decreases monotonically with
the wage, i.e.
F(w|x,z0) ≤ F(w|x,z) ∀w,x,z,z0 with z<z 0. (9)
This means that a higher value of the instrument Z will lead to a distribution of wages that
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of wages with lower values of Z.15 To exploit
this restriction we can ﬁnd tightest bounds over the support of Z and then integrate out Z.F o r
a value of Z = z1 the best lower bound is the largest lower bound over z ≥ z1 in the support of
Z.T h i si sg i v e nb y
F(w|x,z1) ≥ Fl(w|x,z1) ≡ max
z≥z1
F(w|x,z,E =1 ) P(x,z). (10)
Similarly we can obtain a best upper bound at Z = z1 by choosing the smallest possible upper
bound over the support of Z such that z ≤ z1:
F(w|x,z1) ≤ Fu(w|x,z1) ≡ min
z≤z1
F(w|x,z,E =1 ) P(x,z)+1− P(x,z). (11)
The bounds to the distribution of F(w|x) may then be obtained by integrating over the distribution





≤ F(w|x) ≤ EZ [Fu(w|x,Z)|x]. (12)
For the bounds to the distribution of wages F(w|x) to be tightened using the monotonicity
restriction at some value of W = w it has to be that either the lower or the upper bound is
15The reverse assumption is covered in the analysis because we can choose the sign of Z.
13increasing over some range of the support of the instrument Z, subject to them not crossing at
any value of Z. To interpret what this means, observe that
F(w|x,z,E =1 ) P(x,z)=F(w|x,z)Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x,z)
and that F(w|x,z) is decreasing in z by the monotonicity assumption. Thus in order for the lower
bound function to be increasing in z, Pr(E =1 |W ≤ w,x,z) needs to be increasing for some z.
Analogously, in order for the upper bound function to be increasing in z, Pr(E =1 |W>w , x , z )
needs to be decreasing for some z.
Neither the exclusion restriction, nor the monotonicity impose positive selection.
2.1.3 Bounds to within group inequality
Let q1 <q 2 with P (x) <q 1 and q2 < 1 − P (x) and denote corresponding quantiles given x by
wq2 (x) and wq1 (x). To measure inequality within our framework we will be estimating bounds
to the diﬀerences between quantiles:
D(x)=wq2 (x) − wq1 (x). (13)
An example is the interquartile range. To obtain the bounds, note that
F(w|x,E =0 )=
F(w|x) − P(x)F(w|x,E =1 )
1 − P(x)
.
Since F(w|x,E =0 )is non-decreasing in w, the equality places a restriction on F(w|x): F(w|x)
cannot increase slower than P(x)F(w|x,E =1 ) . This provides the upper bound on D(x).
To be more precise, let wq1(u) (x) and wq1(l) (x) be the upper and lower bounds to the q1th
quantile of F(w|x). For any w0 between wq1(l) (x) and wq1(u) (x), F(w|x) with F (w0|x)=q1 is
a candidate CDF. The slowest it can increase is by P(x)F(w|x,E =1 )a n dw h e ni td o e s ,t h e
implied CDF lies entirely between the bounds. This class of CDF can be denoted by
P (x)[F(w|x,E =1 )− F(w0|x,E =1 ) ]+q1.
14Any F(w|x) which is “parallel” to P(x)F(w|x,E =1 )must be one of these. The q2th quantile of




F−1 (F(w0|x,E =1 )+( q2 − q1)/P (x)|x,E =1 )− w0.
Clearly the lower bound is max
¡
0,w q2(l) (x) − wq1(u)(x)
¢
.
It turns out that imposing the implication of F(w|x,E =0 )being a CDF on obtaining the
bounds makes them considerably tighter in practice.
2.1.4 Bounding wage diﬀerentials between groups and their change over time
We will present bounds to the diﬀerence in median wages across education groups, gender, cohort
and age. In contrast to the case where we bound diﬀerences in the quantiles of the same distrib-
ution, there is no restriction on the bounds to diﬀerences in the quantiles across diﬀerent values
of x. Consider the case with two conditioning variables, education and time. We are interested in
D
q
t = wq (ed1,t) − wq (ed0,t).T h i si sg i v e nb y :
wq(l) (ed1,t) − wq(u) (ed0,t) ≤ D
q
t ≤ wq(u) (ed1,t) − wq(l)(ed0,t). (14)
Similarly ∆D
q(l)
ts , the lower bound to D
q
t − Dq
s,i sg i v e nb y
n








ts , the upper bound, is given by
n




wq(l) (ed1,s) − wq(u) (ed0,s)
o
.
Thus, even if the bounds to the quantiles are tight, the bounds to diﬀerentials will be much
larger and those of the change in diﬀerentials larger still. We therefore consider two types of
restrictions that will make these bounds narrower.
The ﬁrst is to assume observables are independent of unobservables and they are log-additively
separable. This is a fairly common assumption made in both the parametric and semiparametric
15selection literature. We show how bounds can be derived under this condition in the Appendix.
However we do not report the results exploiting this restriction as it leads the bounds to cross in
most cases, implying the restriction is invalid.
The second restriction that helps tighten the bounds to the change in educational diﬀerentials
is also on the functional form of log wages. Let ∆D
q
ts (a) denote the change in the educational
diﬀerential between period t and s at age a. We assume that the change in education diﬀerentials
over time are the same across age groups within an age range A (e.g. below 40 versus above 40).





ts ∀a ∈ A. (15)
T h i sw o u l dh o l di ft h ea g ee ﬀect on the qth log-wage quantile for the relevant group is additively
separable and we thus call equation (15) the additivity assumption. The bounds to the change in












We also impose this restriction when estimating bounds to the change in gender wage diﬀerentials.
Deriving the bounds under additivity implies looking for the best bounds across age groups and in
this sense is analogous to the bounds derived from independence, which is shown in the appendix.
3 Wage determination and selection into the labour mar-
ket.
We lay out a framework of wage and employment determination that underlies our interpretation
of the results and highlights the identiﬁcation issues, motivating the use of bounds.
We assume that each individual i in period t p o s s e s s e sa na m o u n to fp r o d u c t i v eh u m a nc a p i t a l
h(sit,a it,x it) which is determined by schooling sit, unobserved ability ait,w h i c hm a yb et i m e
varying, as well as other characteristics such as age, and gender, summarized in xit. The rental
16value of human capital of type s is denoted by ps
t a n di sd e t e r m i n e di nas e to fi n t e r r e l a t e d
competitive labour markets for each schooling type s by equating labour supply to labour demand
for each skill. Thus the equilibrium wage rate for an individual i in period t is
wit = ps
th(sit,a it,x it) (16)
The object of the empirical analysis is to identify the distribution of wages as determined by
16 and how this changes over time. An identiﬁcation problem arises because not all individuals
work at the equilibrium wage. If one does not work, equation 16 deﬁnes the wage that one would
earn if one did work and nothing else changed.
Deﬁne a reservation wage wR
it = wR(sit,e it,z it) where eit reﬂects unobserved tastes for work
that may be correlated with ait; zit are taste shifter variables that may include xit. Within this
framework all those with wit >w R
it are observed working: whether selection into work is positive
or negative with respect to the unobservables will depend on the nature of the joint distribution
of (ait,e it) a n di np a r t i c u l a ro nw h e t h e rwit and wit − wR
it are positively associated. However,
our approach allows for much more general labour supply determination, including the presence
of ﬁxed costs and dynamics. In fact we do not need to specify the way the work decision is
determined, so long as the labour market equilibrium implies that identical individuals are paid
identical wages: the interpretation of our approach relies on the idea that each individual is
associated with a wage, which is his/her opportunity cost of time. Within this context at each
point in time there is a well-deﬁned distribution of wages, which is censored by the employment
process. This is the source of the identiﬁcation problem we address.
Ever since the seminal papers on censoring and selection bias by Gronau (1974) and Heck-
man (1974, 1979) there has been an interest in the question of non-parametric identiﬁcation of
endogenously censored distributions. Heckman and Honoré (1990) provide an in-depth analysis
of identiﬁcation in a Roy model which includes the simple selection model. Heckman (1990),
Ahn and Powell (1993) and Das, Newey and Vella (2003) develop further identiﬁcation results.
17Typically semi-parametric identiﬁcation is proved based on the existence of a continuously distrib-
uted instrument, excludable from the wage distribution, when observables and unobservables are
independent. For non-parametric identiﬁcation the conditions are stronger requiring unbounded
support as in Heckman (1990) for example.
In general it is hard to ﬁnd instruments that satisfy the conditions above and are derived from
economic theory. For example, it has been frequently argued that assets or asset income would
be an instrument that satisﬁed the required conditions. However, other than the fact that most
low educated and young individuals have zero asset income, it is very hard to argue that it is
independent of unobservables that determine wages and participation: individuals who worked
hard in the past and are more productive are likely to have more assets. An alternative source of
instruments may be policy changes or other major events that induce a change in participation
for a well deﬁned “treatment” group. Such instruments are discrete with just few values and do
not satisfy the conditions required for point identiﬁcation.
Thus, our approach was motivated by the fact that the assumptions needed for point identiﬁ-
cation are not easy to justify in practice. The worst case bounds do not rely on any assumptions
other than reference to a labour market paradigm, as above. We then consider stochastic dom-
inance and the weaker median restriction. These assumptions express the notion that workers
are likely to be more productive than non-workers. A direct consequence of the standard labour
supply model is that for individuals with identical reservation wages, the ones with a higher wage
will be more likely to work. Even with heterogeneous preferences for leisure positive selection
will persist if the unobservables determining the reservation wage and the wage are not strongly
positively correlated. In fact as we show empirically there is strong evidence of positive selection.
Results based on the median or stochastic dominance assumption do not necessarily nest
the standard selection model because the latter does not impose positive selection into the labour
market. We thus consider an exclusion restriction, namely that out of work welfare beneﬁti n c o m e
does not aﬀect wages. The exclusion can be motivated with reference to the simple model presented
18above, where out of work income will aﬀect reservation wages but not wages directly. This
approach now nests the standard selection models whose non-parametric identiﬁcation is discussed
in the literature above and does not impose positive selection. To guarantee point identiﬁcation
we would need even stronger assumptions than the simple exclusion restriction we consider. An
important source of variation for the instrument are the policy reforms in the 1980s as outlined
in the introduction and in a section below. However, in practice we ﬁnd evidence against the
exclusion of our instrument from the distributiono fw a g e s .T h i si sb e c a u s eo ft h ew a yt h ew e l f a r e
beneﬁts in the UK depend positively on housing costs.16 Because individuals with higher earnings
are likely to use more expensive housing they will also be to higher welfare beneﬁt income if they
were to be out of work. This creates a positive relationship between wages and our instrument.
We thus relax the exclusion restriction and use the weaker monotonicity assumption which allows
for the positive relationship between wages and the instrument. Our approach is designed for
transparency and the information content of our assumptions is easy to see when compared to the
worst case bounds.
4 Estimation Method
Our main focus will be the bounds to the quantiles. To estimate these we ﬁrst estimate the bounds
t ot h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fw a g e s .W en o wd e s c r i b et h en o n - p a r a m e t r i ce s t i m a t i o np r o c e d u r ew eh a v e
used.
The conditioning vector X includes gender, education, age and time. Estimation of the worst
case bounds and bounds with monotonicity require the estimation of the employment probability
and the distribution of wages observed amongst the workers for each possible set of characteristics
X. For tractability we limit the number of cells as follows. We deﬁne three education groups:
Those who ﬁnished full time education at the age of 16 (statutory schooling), those who continued
16One of the welfare programmes is housing beneﬁt mentioned above. This subsidises rents, whether in public
or private housing and even mortgage repayments for some time.
19until 18 (high school graduates) and those who completed after 18 (at least some college). We
limit the number of ages at which we estimate the bounds for to the ages of 25, 30, 35, 40, 45,
50 and 55 smoothing over neighboring age groups using a quartic kernel as described below. We
also pool years in pairs from 1978/1979 until 1998/2000.17
Thus the probability of employment for an individual with characteristics xk (age, education,
gender and time period) is estimated by
P(xk)=
PN
i=1 I(Ei =1 ) κk(xi)
PN
i=1 κk(xi)
where I(A) is the indicator function which equals one whenever A holds and zero otherwise and
the weights κk(xi) are deﬁned by











I(|agei − agek| < 3).
To estimate the empirical distribution of wages for workers we found it advantageous to allow for
some smoothing. Thus the estimator we use is






I(Ei =1 ) κk(xi)
PN
i=1 I(Ei =1 ) κk(xi)
where h i ss e ta taﬁfth of the standard deviation of wages.
The next estimation problem, relevant for computing the bounds with exclusion or monotonic-
ity restrictions is the estimation of the probability of employment and the distribution of wages
conditional on the instrument Z which in our case is the out of work income and can be regarded
as continuous.
To reduce the computational burden we use the percentile ranks of out of work income Z.W e
then estimate the bounds to the distribution of wages and the probability of employment only at
a subset of the percentile ranks, every ﬁve percentile. The weights for estimation are now given
17As we only have one quarter of data for the year 2000, we pool these individuals with those sample in 1998 or
1999
20by












I(|zi − zk| ≤ 0.2).
The estimated bounds are then substituted in equations (8), (10) and (11) to obtain estimates
of the bounds under the exclusion and the monotonicity restriction, respectively. In the latter
case we need to integrate over the distribution of the instrument (see (12)) which we do using the
empirical distribution of the instrument Z given X = x. The bounds to the quantiles are then
estimated by solving the analogous equations to those in (3).
We construct conﬁdence intervals for the parameters of interest, namely the quantiles, the
diﬀerentials across groups and the changes in the diﬀerentials over time using the bootstrap18
and applying the results of Imbens and Manski (2004). These are narrower than the conﬁdence
intervals for the estimated identiﬁcation region itself.
4.1 Speciﬁcation tests and conﬁdence intervals.
4.1.1 Testing that the bounds do not cross
If the exclusion and monotonicity restrictions are invalid they may lead to the restricted upper
bound being less than or equal to the restricted lower bound, which implies that they do have a
testable implication. However, as the bounds may never cross even when the restrictions are in-
valid, any speciﬁcation test will not be an asymptotically uniformly powerful test of the restrictions
themselves but rather that the bounds do not cross. Nevertheless, if we reject the hypothesis that
the bounds do not cross, then we must also reject the hypothesis about the assumed relationship
between our instrument and the distribution of wages.
Even if in the population the bounds are equal, implying a point estimate, in any ﬁnite sample
they will often cross just because of sampling error. Thus we need a formal test for the hypothesis
18see below
21that the lower bound is less than or equal to the upper bound against the alternative that bounds
cross. To achieve this we use the following test statistics: Denoting the sum over all discrete



























I( ˆ Fub(w|x,z) − ˆ Flb(w|x,z) < 0)( ˆ Fub(w|x,z) − ˆ Flb(w|x,z))2
i)#
(18)
where ˆ Fub(w|x) and ˆ Flb(w|x,z) are the estimate of the upper bound under exclusion and under
monotonicity, respectively and similarly for the lower bounds. Thus the test statistic is the average
over the distribution of X and over wages of all the squared violations of the bounds conditional
(and over z for the monotonicity restriction.
Deriving and computing the asymptotic distribution of these test statistics is not straight-
forward. Moreover, because of the max operator involved in estimating the bounds under the
exclusion or the monotonicity restriction, it is unclear whether or not the non-parametric boot-
strap is valid. Thus we have opted for using a combination of the parametric and non-parametric
bootstrap in the following way:19 All our estimates and test statistics are functions of the esti-
mates of P(X) and F(w|X,E =1 )or P(X,Z) and F(w|X,Z,E =1 )for which the the regularity
conditions for the bootstrap are satisﬁed and which are asymptotically normal. We thus start
by using the non-parametric bootstrap to compute the covariance matrix of these estimates. We
assume the estimates are independent conditional on X and Z, but correlated within these cells.
We then draw samples of the employment probability and the observed distribution of wages from
their asymptotic normal distribution to compute conﬁdence intervals and values of test statistics
that depend on them. In particular, to estimate the critical values of the test statistic for the null
19We thank Ariel Pakes for suggesting this.
22hypothesis that the bounds do not cross we recenter the test statistics so that the null is satisﬁed






















I(∆ ˜ F (w|x,z) − ∆ ˆ F(w|x,z) < 0)(∆ ˜ F (w|x,z) − ∆ ˆ F(w|x,z))2
ioi
Monotonicity
where ˜ denotes an estimate based on a bootstrap sample and ∆ denotes a diﬀerence between the
upper and lower bounds; for example ∆ ˆ F (w|x)= ˆ Fub (w|x)− ˆ Flb (w|x) and similarly for all other
expressions preceded by ∆. From the simulated values of this centered bootstrap test statistic we
can derive the p-values of our test.
In this way, we approach this testing problem analogously to testing for the location of multiple
means. We have not proved that the above centering procedure provides the appropriate critical
values for our test. However in the appendix we do provide some Monte Carlo evidence that these
test statistics have good size and power properties in our context. See Appendix A.
Deriving point estimates when the bounds cross It is also necessary to derive consistent
estimates of the bounds in the case where they cross. Under the null that the diﬀerence between
the upper and lower bounds is zero, then the both the upper and lower bound estimates are
consistent estimates of the actual quantile of wages we are interested in. Choosing either the
estimate of upper or of the lower bound would give us consistent estimates of this quantile then,
but a more eﬃcient approach would be to use a weighted combination of the upper and lower
bounds i.e.
ˆ wq = αˆ wq(u) +( 1− α)ˆ wq(l)
where α is chosen optimally to minimize the asymptotic variance of ˆ wq using the estimated
asymptotic distribution of ˆ wq(u) and ˆ wq(l). We use the bootstrap to estimate the distribution of
the upper and lower bounds.
234.1.2 Testing for the absence of selection eﬀects
The worst case bounds cannot be informative about whether there is a non-random selection prob-
lem or not; they can just tell us the extent to which selection can bias the results. However, when
we impose the monotonicity restriction or the exclusion restriction the bounds to the distribution
may not include the observed distribution which is evidence that selection does bias the results.
However the diﬀerence may not be statistically signiﬁcant and thus we develop a test statistic for
the null hypothesis that the observed distribution is within the bounds.
Under the null hypothesis we have that
Flb(w|x) ≤ F(w|x,E =1 )≤ Fub(w|x) .
























This provides a joint test for all the values of x. To obtain the critical values we again use the
bootstrap after recentering so that the null is satisﬁed in the sample.
5R e s u l t s
The aim of the empirical analysis is to examine the changes in the distribution of wages ac-
counting for the possible eﬀects of changes in worker composition. While a traditional analysis
b a s e do np o i n te s t i m a t e sw o u l do ﬀer exact statements about the eﬀects of selection, an analysis
based on bounds provides ranges of changes that cannot be explained by composition changes,
or alternatively, the maximal eﬀects from selection. We characterize the changes in the overall
distribution of wages by considering overall inequality, within group inequality as well as between
group components based on cohort, gender and educational diﬀerentials. Our inequality measure
is the interquartile range, which can be bounded. Across groups we compare medians.
245.1 Data and variable deﬁnitions
The data we used for the analysis is the pooled repeated cross sections of the UK Family Expen-
diture Surveys (FES) from 1978 to the ﬁrst quarter 2000, which contains the period where most
of the important changes took place in the UK. However, contrary to the earlier UK studies we
also include women. Thus the sample consists ofa l lm e na n dw o m e nb e t w e e nt h ea g e so f2 3a n d
59 who were not in full time education. This gave us a sample of 187,467 individuals in total.
Hourly wages, which are the object of the analysis are deﬁned as usual weekly earnings divided
by usual weekly hours (inclusive of overtime) and are deﬂated by the consumer all items quarterly
retail price index. Deﬂated wages lower than 50p an hour were also treated as missing at random.
We deﬁned individuals to be in “work” (i.e. E =1 ) if they were reported themselves as being
employed, whether full or part time or self employed over the last week. We treated the self-
employed as employed in estimating employment probabilities. However, since wages and hours
of work are not reliably measured for this group we assume their wages are missing at random
and so exclude them from the calculation of F(w|x,E =1 ) .
Constructing out of work income For the models where we use an exclusion or monotonicity
restriction the instrument for employment will be the welfare beneﬁts that the person would be
eligible for when out of work. This variable has been used before by Blundell, Reed and Stoker
(2003) and is constructed from the IFS20 tax and welfare-beneﬁtm o d e l . M o r es p e c i ﬁcally for
singles we use the beneﬁt level for which they would be entitled if they did not work. For married
or cohabiting individuals we take the household beneﬁt level that they would be eligible for if
neither worked.
The source of variation for out-of-work income is the demographic composition of the household
and the housing costs that the household faces. The latter vary by region and over time due to the
numerous policy changes that have occurred. These include: First, an increase in the allowance
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Figure 4: Probability of work and out of work income
for children so that the childless have experienced relative falls in their out of work income. Second
there was a switch in housing policy away from rent ceilings on public housing towards subsidies on
the actual rent paid starting in 1983. The policy allowed public housing rents to increase, following
market rents and deregulated market rents ﬁnally in 1988. This in turn induced increases in out of
work beneﬁti n c o m ea td i ﬀerential rates across regions, substantially increasing the replacement
rates and reducing the incentives to work for those with high levels of housing. Since housing
costs and hence housing beneﬁts increased more or less continuously over the period of the data,
the replacement rates kept increasing, which can explain at least partly the decline in overall
participation and particularly of the unskilled.
We deﬁne the instrument as the residual in a regression of out of work income on household
composition. The resulting variable depends region of residence and individual household housing
costs.21 Thus, because of the way housing beneﬁt operates, the instrument is likely to be positively
associated with wages: Individuals who generally earn more will be in better housing and hence
eligible for higher housing beneﬁt when out of work temporarily. Thus the distribution of wages
21Removing permanent regional diﬀerences does not aﬀect the results.
26conditional on higher values of beneﬁt income will most likely ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate
the distribution of wages conditional on lower values. Under this assumption, beneﬁti n c o m e
although possibly invalid as an exclusion restriction, may satisfy the monotonicity restriction.
The instrument must be related to employment. We test the hypothesis that our measure of
out of work income does not aﬀect employment conditional on the other observable characteristics
(age, time, gender and education) and we reject both overall and within education and gender
cells with a p-value of zero in all cases. The distributions of our test statistics under the null are
approximated by the bootstrap. As an illustration, in Figure 4 we show the impact of beneﬁt
income on the employment probability of 30-year old women with statutory education. In that
case employment varies from 80% to 50% as beneﬁt income increases from its 8th percentile to its
median.
5.2 The validity of our restrictions
5.2.1 The Stochastic Dominance and median restrictions
We have argued that the stochastic dominance restriction (4) or the median restriction (6) could
be violated particularly for older individuals due to asset eﬀects and for women due to positive
sorting in the labour market.
In Figure (5) we use longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey 1991-2001
(BHPS) to show that such eﬀects may not be that important and that positive selection is indeed
reasonable. We have regressed log wages for each year of the panel separately on age and educa-
tion and allocated workers a residual (i.e. actual wage minus predicted wage). We then split the
sample into those who had some employment interruption over the period and those who were
continuously employed. Figure (5) shows that the quantiles of the distribution of wages of those
continuously in work lie above the quantiles of the distribution for those who have had a work
interruption, even controlling for factors such as age and education which are important determi-
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Figure 5: Distributions of residual wages by gender, education and work histories.
28for non-workers. In fact this graph provides support for the stochastic dominance assumption.
Nevertheless we are missing individuals who never work, which is approximately 5.63% of men
and 11.32% of women.
5.2.2 The exclusion and monotonicity restriction for out of work income
When we impose the exclusion or the monotonicity restrictions with respect to out-of-work beneﬁt
income the bounds could cross. For women, the bounds never cross and as a result the p-values of
our tests are always one implying no restriction can be rejected. This is not surprising given the
lower employment rate and the resulting wide worst case bounds of women. For men the results
are more conclusive. The exclusion restriction forces the bounds to cross frequently and this is
highly signiﬁcant both overall and within each education group (in each case the signiﬁcance levels
are always below 2.2%). On the other hand the monotonicity restriction is never rejected and in
each case the p-values are larger that 88.5%. When we combine the median with the monotonicity
restriction the lowest p-value we obtain is 46% implying that the combined restrictions do not
lead to the bounds crossing in a signiﬁcant way.
We also tested the independence and additivity restrictions which we consider using for tight-
ening the bounds to the changes in educational and gender wage diﬀerentials over time. Indepen-
dence of education and time is rejected with a p-value of zero and we do not present any empirical
results based on this. We then tested the hypothesis that the changes in educational diﬀerentials
for men were independent of age for those below 40 and for those above. The former restriction
is acceptable, while the latter is rejected at the 9.5% level. Finally we repeated these tests for
the change in gender wage diﬀerentials and the restrictions are accepted easily within both age
groups.
295.2.3 Selection eﬀects
We ﬁnd that for most age and education groups the selectivity test fails to reject the hypothesis
that the random selection outcome is included in our restricted bounds (median and monotonicity
imposed) with one notable exception: the signiﬁcance level for men over 40 in the statutory
schooling group was 2.2%, and thus for this group we can reject the hypothesis of no selection
eﬀects. For our other groups the results are not conclusive about selection.
5.3 Changes in the distribution of wages
We now use our empirical approach to examine the changing distribution of wages in the UK
1978-2000. When women are concerned we focus only how the median wage and the educational
and gender wage diﬀerentials have evolved. In our graphs, when useful we present 95% conﬁdence
intervals for the unidentiﬁed parameter as in Imbens and Manski (2004). These intervals are
constructed using the bootstrap as described earlier. Following estimates reported in the text we
report a standard error italicized in parentheses.
5.3.1 Trends in inequality
Figure 6 plots the upper and lower bound to the interquartile range, our inequality measure,
from 1978 to 2000 for the male wage distribution.22 The central line shows, for comparison,
what has happened to wage inequality amongst workers and the dotted lines give 95% conﬁdence
intervals. We can only say for certain that inequality has gone up if the lower bound at the end
of the period is higher than the upper bound at the beginning of the period. The worst case
lower bound in 1998-2000 is higher than the worst case upper bound in 1978-80, suggesting that
inequality as measured by the interquartile range must have risen by at least 0.089 log points
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Figure 6: Upper and lower bounds to male wage inequality over time
31(0.02).23 This means that selection eﬀects alone cannot explain the rise in inequality observed
amongst workers of 0.252 (0.022) points.24 We then show results using the median restriction,
the monotonicity restriction (that do not impose positive selection) and the combination of the
median and monotonicity restrictions.
Under the combined median and monotonicity restriction the interquartile range must have
risen by at least 0.252 (0.022) log points which is slightly less than the rise of the interquartile
range of the distribution of wages for workers (0.268, 0.017). Thus, once we account for selection
the actual (latent) increase in inequality seems to be at least as large as the one observed among
workers. If anything, composition changes may have masked some of the increase. Table 1
summarizes these results and presents p-values demonstrating inequality must have increased
o v e rt h es a m p l ep e r i o d .
Table 1: Changes to inequality over time
Lower Bound to the 95% Conﬁdence Interval
Change in IQR1 78-98
No restrictions 0.089 [0.034,0.108]
Median Restriction 0.127 [0.077,0.151]
Monotonicity Restriction 0.189 [0.162,0.272]
Median plus Monotonicity Restrictions 0.252 [0.198,0.289]
Stochastic Dominance 0.185 [0.130,0.207]
Observed change 0.268 [0.230,0.294]
1IQR: Interquartile range of log wages. 95% conﬁdence interval based on the bootstrap.
23The italicised number presented in parenthesis here and below are the standard error of the estimate computed
using the bootstrap outlined above.
24As an extra benchmark we also estimate the increase in the interquartile range keeping the workforce to its
original 1978 composition (i.e. controlling for selection on observables). In this case the estimated increase in this
case is 0.197.
325.3.2 Within group inequality
A feature of the increase in inequality in Britain (as well as in the US) has been the large increase
in male observed wage dispersion within education and age groups, which authors have attributed
to an increase in the importance of unobserved skill.25 I nT a b l e2w es h o wt h el o w e rb o u n dt o
the increase in within education group inequality together with a 95% conﬁdence interval. The
ﬁgure presented is the average lower bound to the change in the interquartile range of log wages
from 1978-1998. The average is over diﬀerent age groups and in the ﬁrst column over education
groups as well.26
Without imposing any restrictions we can establish an increase for the entire sample period
which is signiﬁcant for the College group and marginally so for the High School one, but not for
the statutory schooling group.27 However substantial and signiﬁcant increases are estimated for
all education groups once we impose the monotonicity restriction. The overall picture is shown
in ﬁgure 7 where the bounds based on both the monotonicity restriction and the combination of
this and the median restriction are presented. For most periods, imposing positive selection (the
median restriction) does not aﬀect these results much relative to using the monotonicity restriction
alone. Imposing positive selection seems to matter most towards the end of the sample, where
this additional restriction leads to substantially tighter bounds.
5.4 Life-Cycle Wage proﬁles and Inter cohort growth
Changes in inequality may also be driven by changes in the life-cycle proﬁles and by the way these
relate to inter-cohort growth of wages. More generally, the study of labour supply, of ageing and
25Again we focus on men.
26When we compare inequality measures across groups, over time and across restrictions an issue arises because
of small cell sizes. For some cells less than 25% of males are working implying that the worst case bounds to the top
quartile are not deﬁned. Although these are sometimes deﬁned with more restrictive assumptions, for the purposes
of comparability we delete all cells where the inequality measure is undeﬁnded under some model.
27The joint test that the lower bound to the IQR did not increase in any age/education group is rejected with
a p-value of less than 5% even when no restrictions are imposed, despite tha fact that the average increase to the
lower bound does not seem signiﬁcant at 5%.
33Table 2: Lower bound of the change to the within group Interquartile Range of log wages 1978-1998
All education Statutory High School Some
groups Schooling Graduates College
No Restrictions 0.015 -0.017 0.093 0.112
[-0.008,0.051] [-0.043,0.031] [-0.001,0.173] [0.030,0.183]
Median Restriction 0.015 -0.017 0.093 0.112
[-0.002,0.056] [-0.037,0.037] [0.001,0.175] [0.033,0.185]
Monotonicity Restriction 0.088 0.076 0.108 0.140
[0.081,0.172] [0.067,0.187] [0.042,0.220] [0.069,0.218]
Median plus Monotonicity Restriction 0.087 0.076 0.108 0.129
[0.081,0.156] [0.069,0.160] [0.034,0.211] [0.063,0.208]
Stochastic dominance 0.071 0.049 0.131 0.142
[0.054,0.107] [0.028,0.091] [0.042,0.206] [0.070,0.217]
Observed Change 0.169 0.160 0.175 0.203
[0.143,0.193] [0.128,0.185] [0.095,0.253] [0.132,0.265]






























Monotonicity plus median restriction
Figure 7: Changes to within group inequality over time by education group
35of savings and pensions, amongst other ﬁelds, rely on knowledge of wage growth over the life-cycle.
However, understanding life-cycle growth is fraught with diﬃculty relating to composition eﬀects
induced by selection in and out of work making bounds particularly useful.
In Figures 8 to 10 we present bounds to the median wages of each education group by age
for ﬁve cohorts each born 10 years apart (1925, 35, 45, 55 and 65). For the oldest cohort only
one age point is available. Within each graph we present results based on the worst case bounds,
the median restriction, the monotonicity restriction and those obtained from both restrictions.
Following these in Figure 11 we show results for females based only on the monotonicity restriction
combined with the median, which proved to be the acceptable restriction leading to the tightest
bounds. In these graphs moving from left to right gives the growth of wages by age. Moving from
one cohort to the next at the same age gives the cohort/time eﬀect. To establish growth over age
we need to compare the upper bound of the median at the lower age to the lower bound at the
higher age; Similarly for inter-cohort growth.
Those with just statutory schooling28 (see Figure 8) have the lowest employment rates and
therefore the widest bounds. Nevertheless the worst case lower bound to wage growth between
t h ea g e so f2 5t o3 5i s1 6 %( 2.7%) for the 1955 cohort and for wage growth between the ages of
35 and 45 is 6% (2.7%) for those born in 1945. The bounds become considerably tighter when we
impose restrictions and almost all ambiguity is eliminated with the combination of median and
monotonicity. Combining information across cohorts these show unambiguous growth of wages up
until age 45. Beyond that age, when we impose both the median and the monotonicity restrictions,
wages are shown to be either ﬂat or declining. If we do not impose positive selection, but just
monotonicity our bounds are uninformative about wage growth beyond 50 for the statutory group.
We can also detect substantial inter-cohort growth between the 1935 and 1945 cohorts at the
a g eo f4 5o fa tl e a s t6 % ,( 3%). It is hard to ﬁnd evidence of growth across more cohorts without
making any economic restrictions. With the monotonicity and median restrictions, however we see
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Figure 8: Life-cycle and cohort wage proﬁles for males who left school at or before 16 (the statutory
schooling group)
across cohort growth of at least 11% (3%) between the 1935 and 1945 cohorts and minimal growth
of around 6% (3% ) at age 35 but the lower bound is below zero at the age of 30. Thus there
is evidence that inter-cohort growth is declining for those with just statutory schooling, although
we are forced to compare these at diﬀerent ages.
The median and the monotonicity restriction provide very tight bounds for the high school
graduates29 (Figure 9) . There is substantial life-cycle wage growth of the median wage between
the age of 25 and 45. Growth becomes ﬂatter beyond that, but wages can be shown to continue
to grow, once one imposes the monotonicity restriction up until age 55.
Figure 10 shows that wages of those with some college education are increasing both across
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Figure 9: Life-cycle and cohort wage proﬁles for males who left school at 17 or 18 years of age
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Figure 10: Life-cycle and cohort wage proﬁles for males who left full time education after18 years
of age (some College group).
cohorts and over the life-cycle. Interestingly the data clearly reject the hypothesis that wages
fall at older ages over the life-cycle up to the age of 55, for the oldest cohort wages keep growing
between the ages of 50 and 55.
The results for women Figure in 11 are based on both the median and the monotonicity
restriction. It is hard to establish much for younger cohorts of women with just statutory schooling
(top panel of Figure 11) as employment rates are very low for this group. However, there has been
a clear growth of wages with age for the 1945 cohort; growth between the 1945 and 1955 cohort
at the age of 40 has been at least 13%. Some lifecycle and inter-cohort growth is also evident for
the two higher education groups (middle and lower panels of Figure 11).
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Figure 11: Lifecycle and cohort wage proﬁles of women by education group obtained from imposing
both the median and monotonicity restrictions
40on the median and the monotonicity restrictions. This conﬁrms the wage growth over the ﬁrst
half of working life for all education groups. For those with no post secondary education, we can
also see that diﬀerentials at the end of the period are indeed higher than those at the beginning:
wage diﬀerentials associated with cohort/age have risen even after controlling for the possible non
random allocation of individuals into work. The table included in the ﬁgure presents the lower
bound to the 1978-1998 change and some tests for the hypothesis of no change. It is possible
to reject the hypothesis of no change for the High school graduates and more marginally for the
other two groups (2nd column) Overall ﬁgure 12 demonstrates that either cohort eﬀects or an
increasing return to experience are an important feature of the changing wage structure over the
1980s and 1990s at least for some education groups.30
5.5 Educational and gender diﬀerentials
5.5.1 Educational diﬀerentials
In Figure 13 we provide a picture of the educational diﬀerentials and how they change over time
a n da c r o s sc o h o r t sb a s e do nt h em o n o t o n i c i t ya n dm e d i a nr e s t r i c t i o n s .
The diﬀerence in the medians of the wage distribution between those with some college educa-
tion and the statutory schooling group clearly increase with age. We cannot conﬁrm the presence
of cohort or time eﬀects in the returns although the bounds are consistent with these being quite
high. This is a key point because on the basis of these results we cannot be sure whether returns
to education have increased. When consider the returns of college relative to high school cohort
eﬀects seem more important: The oldest cohort has the highest returns with the next cohort
coming in much lower, followed by an increase between the 1945 and 1955 cohort and then a zero
or high increase between the 1955 and 1965 cohorts. Thus for recent cohorts the changing returns
to education may have contributed to the increase in inequality.
30A test of the restriction that diﬀerences have not changed over time for those with no College education obtained
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Figure 12: Bounds to the diﬀerence in the median log wages of 45 year olds to those of 25 year
olds
42To summarize some of these results with numbers, educational diﬀerentials between College
and High school increased by between 0.04 (0.069) and 0.25 (0.072)l o gp o i n t sf o r2 5y e a ro l d s .
For 40 year olds the increase lies between 0.095 (0.08)a n d0 . 1 9 5( 0.073)l o gp o i n t s .
Further results (not shown on the graph) are obtained by imposing the additivity restriction31
For 25 year olds the increase is estimated to be between 0.140 (0.039)a n d0 . 1 6 9( 0.039)l o gp o i n t s
and much more precisely estimated. For 40 years olds we get a point estimate of zero which is
not included in the unrestricted bounds given above. This suggests that the additivity restriction
for 40 year olds is invalid. The p-value of the test for this restriction is 9.5%.
For women all the estimated bounds to the changes span zero, meaning that we cannot reject
the possibility that the return to education has remained the same. Note that even the changes
amongst women observed working are small and sometimes so this failure to ﬁnd a clear result
with bounds should not be a surprise. Nevertheless when positive selection is imposed the lower
bound to the change in the return to education is high (at least 20%).
5.5.2 Gender wage diﬀerentials
How do the wages of women compare to those of men? How has this diﬃcult relationship evolved
over time? Compositional issues are crucial here, because the selection process into work may be
diﬀerent for women compared to men and may have changed with the large changes in employ-
ment rates. This problem is very similar to that faced by those interested in understanding the
convergence of black and white observed wages in the 1960s and 1970s (see Butler and Heckman,
1977). Brown (1984) and Smith and Welch (1986) adopt diﬀerent strategies to deal with this that
can both be considered as special cases of our approach. More recently Blau and Kahn (2004)
have emphasized the potential importance of changes in selectivity as a factor that may explain
the observed slowdown in the reduction of the US gender pay gap.32
31See equation (15). This restriction is used to see if we can further tighten the estimates with an assumption
frequently used in parametric analysis.
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Figure 13: Bounds to the diﬀerences in median log wages between education groups obtained by
imposing both median and monotonicity restrictions
44The worst case bounds to the change in the diﬀerentials are uninformative because of the
lower employment rates for women, particularly in the statutory schooling group. This in itself
illustrates how important compositional eﬀects can be. To obtain something informative we
present results in Figure 14 based on the combination of the monotonicity, the median and the
additivity restriction, which we impose to tighten the bounds and to improve the precision of their
estimation. We have also assumed that changes in diﬀerentials are the same for all those with less
than college education, thus combining the statutory schooling and the high school group. In the
ﬁgure the box denotes the bound to the change in the diﬀerential between 1978 and 1998 and the
thin line the 95% conﬁdence interval for the unidentiﬁed change.
For this combined group the male/female diﬀerential declined from 1978 to 1998 by between
0.23 and 0.28 log points and the conﬁdence interval implies that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. We
have already argued that the median restriction does not seem to be at odds with the available
evidence (see ﬁgure 5 and the discussion around it) generally and even more so for young men
and women. However as a robustness check we have computed the bounds to the diﬀerential
by dropping the median restriction which here imposes positive selection into the labour market
for both men and women. We ﬁnd that the upper bound to the change in the diﬀerential is
just negative (-0.005) although the upper end of the conﬁdence interval now reaches 0.19. Thus
imposing positive selection is quite crucial in obtaining our precise result. However the point
estimate of the bounds do not cross zero even if we do not impose the median restriction. Given
also the fact there is little circumstantial evidence against it we conclude that the diﬀerential for
this group did indeed decline.
The change observed between working men and women was about 0.21 log points. This
suggests that composition eﬀects may conceal part of the improvement in the labour market
position of women. The other declines are not signiﬁcant. Moreover for the group with some













Figure 14: Upper and lower bounds to changes to the diﬀerence in median wages between men
and women obtained by imposing both restrictions
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to develop an approach to dealing with non-random selection into
employment when analyzing the wage distribution; the key problem we had to address was that in
the presence of censoring there are no obvious identiﬁcation strategies that will point identify the
wage distribution without making strong assumptions. To deal with this issue we have developed
bounds based on theoretically motivated restrictions from economic theory.
In our empirical analysis we have used our approach to examine changes in wage inequality
from 1978 to 2000 using the UK Family Expenditure Survey, while at the same time accounting
for the possible impact of the large changes in employment and its composition. We compare
results using worst case bounds which do not impose any restrictions to the ones that do. The
restrictions we consider are that the probability of work is higher for those with higher wages, that
the wage distribution is independent of out-of-work beneﬁt income and alternatively that higher
values of such income are positively associated with wages.
The worst case bounds do establish that inequality has increased. However, the restricted
46bounds are much tighter and can lead to stronger and unambiguous conclusions on an number of
issues for which the worst case bounds are uninformative. Some of these restrictions have testable
implications for which we develop tests. The exclusion of out-of-work beneﬁt income from wages, is
strongly rejected. A weaker restriction that requires the instrument to be monotonically associated
with the wage distribution is never rejected and our empirical results are mainly based on this.
Using our analysis we establish that inequality increased both overall and within education
groups by more than can be explained by changes in composition. There have also been signiﬁcant
increases in age/cohort diﬀerentials. Educational diﬀerentials can be shown to have increased for
both 25 and 45 year olds although this result is more signiﬁcant for the younger men. Gender
wage diﬀerentials improved for women by at least 23 percentage points in the 25 year old unskilled
group. However for other groups the upper bound to the change may show an improvement but
it is not signiﬁcant (40 year old unskilled group) or the upper bound is zero and even positive
(College group).
A Monte Carlo simulations of the testing procedure
We conducted Monte Carlo simulations to examine the power and size properties of our test.
The null hypothesis is that the bounds are equal and the alternative is that they cross. In this
appendix we describe the model used in the simulation.
The model under the null hypothesis is
W = ε1 (19)
Z = I(ε2 > 0)
E =[ I(W<0.75) + I(W ≥ 0.75)I(ε3 > 0)]Z
+[I(W>−0.75) + I(W ≤− 0.75)I(ε3 > 0)](1 − Z)
where ε1, ε2 and ε3 are independent standard normal random variables. Under the null hypothesis
47W and Z are independent. As an alternative we consider




The structure of the determination of employment shown in equation (19) will mean that the
bounds touch in the population over a positive range of wages which is our null. To see this note
max
z F(w|z,E =1 )P r ( E =1 |z)=m i n
z [F(w|z,E =1 )P r ( E =1 )+1− Pr(E =1 |z)].
Given that F(w|z)=F(w), this expression is identical to
max
z F(w)Pr(E =1 |z,W < w)=m i n
z [F(w)Pr(E =1 |z,W < w)+1− Pr(E =1 |z)].
This can be rearranged to give:
max
z F(w)Pr(E =1 |z,W < w)=1− max
z {[1 − F(w)]Pr(E =1 |z,W ≥ w)}.
The above expression can be true if and only if the following is true
max
z Pr(E =1 |z,W < w)=m a x
z Pr(E =1 |z,W ≥ w)=1 . (21)
Pr(E =1 |z)=1is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition for equation (21) to hold. The
bounds will be equal when there is a value of z for which all those with wages below w work and
a value of z for which all those with wages above the same w work. These values of z may not be
the same. Both bounds reduce to an unconditional CDF.
Equation (19) and our Monte Carlo simulations forces condition (21) to hold for a large range
of wages: Consider any value w between −0.75 and 0.75.W h e n Z =1and W<w ,e v e r y o n e
works. When Z =0and W>w , everyone works as well. So the upper and lower bounds for
the model coincide for any w between −0.75 and 0.75. Figure 15 below shows how the estimated
distribution functions obtained from imposing the exclusion restriction look like in the population.
We carried out two Monte Carlo simulations; one with 500 observations and one with a 1000.
























-2.8 -2 -1.2 -0.4 0.41 1.21 2.01 2.8 3.6
Lower Bound Upper Bound


































Figure 15: Estimated population distribution functions from simulated data
49expressed in equations (20) and (19). Within each replication we used the bootstrap with 114
draws to compute critical values for a nominal size of 5% for the test statistic in (17), as described
in the main body of the paper. We also considered a version of the test where the Σw is replaced
by a maxw (maximum over wages)
The results are shown in Table 3 below
Table 3: Power and size of our test
Ho is true Ho is false
500 obs 1000 obs 500 obs 1000 obs
10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 5%
Max 0.045 0.023 0.049 0.024 0.748 0.602 0.954 0.919
Mean 0.046 0.023 0.045 0.019 0.800 0.667 0.968 0.926
Table 3 shows ﬁrst that both tests are a bit under sized even for the larger sample size of 1000.
Both tests have excellent power properties, with the power being a bit better in the version we
have adopted at the smaller sample size. Overall the results seem to suggest that our inferential
approach is reliable and powerful.
B Using independence restrictions
Many empirical studies impose independence of the instrument used in correcting for selection
from the unobservables in wages. This independence assumption is reﬂe c t e di nt h ef a c tt h a tt h e
selection model is single index and that the coeﬃcient of the selection correction term(s) do not
depend on the instrument. In this section we explore how such an independence assumption,
without any other restrictions, can help tighten the bounds to educational diﬀerentials or other
characteristics X.
Suppose we partition the vector of observables into the sub-vectors X1 and X2 and suppose
50that the dependent variable can be written as
W = m(X1,X2)+ε
where F(ε|X1,X2)=F(ε|X1) In this case none of the quantiles of ε depend on X2. Hence we




In this context the impact of changing X2 (say education) is easily deﬁned. Moreover the indepen-
dence restriction can be used to obtain a tight bound for such a return. First note that the impact







∆X2m(X1,X2) does not depend on q.33 Then under these assumptions the tightest bound on the





















If the independence assumption is invalid the bounds may cross.
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